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  While the second World War is often seen as a singular, worldwide 
conflict, it is better viewed as two separate but simultaneous conflicts: the 
European Theater, encompassing the fighting in Europe and North Africa, and 
the Pacific Theater, encompassing the fighting across the Pacific Ocean region. 
This distinction must be made because the fighting was quite different in the two 
theaters, despite the common belligerents and the fact that both conflicts were 
taking place at the same time. 
 But why must the fighting in the Pacific and European theaters be 
considered separately? It is fundamentally an issue of geography. The character 
of the war in the two theaters was different because the divergent geography of 
the regions in which the war would was fought. The geography of the Pacific 
Ocean region, and of the various islands in the Pacific region that would 
become the battlefields of the war in the Pacific, would each leave their 
own indelible mark on the fighting. Strategic and tactical doctrine would 
have to be adapted to the unique conditions found on many of the islands. 
Technological advances would have to be made in order to make the large 
scale amphibious landings feasible, and the environmental factors present 
on many islands necessitated massive scientific efforts. Concepts of warfare 
rooted in hundreds of years of Western conflicts spanning Europe and the 
Americas would often be inapplicable in the Pacific. The geography of the Pacific 
would force the combatants to plan their moves, both offensively and defensively, 
around the terrain of the islands, and the vast expanses of the Pacific ocean. 
In his magisterial work to catalogue the geographic and geologic 
 peculiarities of each island that played a part in the fighting in the Pacific Theater, 
Gordon L. Rottman observed that “The Pacific theater in World War II... 
...presented an extremely difficult strategic and tactical operating environment to 
all of the belligerents.”1 Not only would the logistical challenges posed by the 
expanses of the Pacific prove daunting, but that “coupled with the vast distances, 
inhospitable climate, rugged terrain, the variables found on different islands, and 
the very nature of the reality of combat in the Pacific, it was one of the most 
difficult and challenging military theaters of operations experienced.”2 
 Each major war or conflict has been built upon lessons learned in the last 
war. The collective knowledge of war is continually added to, refined, and applied 
in the next conflict. The opening days of World War II in Europe saw a frightening 
display of the application of highly refined combined arms warfare strategy, in the 
form of the German blitzkrieg. The emergent concept of “combined arms” warfare 
was perhaps best defined in a modern sense in 1907 by British Maj. Gerald 
Gilbert, when he observed that “We have gotten into the fashion of talking of 
cavalry tactics, artillery tactics, and infantry tactics. This distinction is nothing but 
a mere abstraction. There is but one art, and that is of the combined arms.”3 The 
German blitzkreig doctrine was perhaps the most adept application of this theory 
of warfare at the time, and today is still cited as one of the most enduring lessons 
of the war. However, it was not the only lesson learned from the war, and the 
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 lessons learned of the German model of combined arms warfare would have little 
to no bearing on the other side of the world, on the islands of the Pacific. 
In his magnum opus on the topic of combined arms, Jonathan M. House 
wrote that “the mechanized combined arms force came of age in this war.”4 While 
this is true of the war in Europe, the war in the Pacific was a very different matter. 
Rather than building off of the experiences and teachings of the previous war, the 
war in the Pacific forced those in command to rethink the lessons that they had 
learned from the previous wars, and even from the opening stages of the war in 
Europe. The Pacific would force those in command to relearn how to fight a war, 
and adapt their strategies and tactics to the geography of the Pacific.  
This quandary that the officers would find themselves in is perhaps best 
exemplified in this passage from Josephine C. Bresnehan’s dissertation on the 
topic of combat fatigue in the Pacific: 
As the old West Point adage had it, after all, getting an infantry division to 
carry out its first successful engagement was teaching a horse to waltz. At 
the start of the fighting, many military commanders may not have 
anticipated how difficult leading the dance might be in the Pacific theater. 
Neither their profession experience nor their experience in the last war 
could have prepared them for the conditions under which commanders 
had to map out ground strategy and show their line officers how to 
motivate and lead their troops in what were then called the Solomon 
Islands and New Guinea in 1942 and 1943.5 
 
The geography of the Pacific seemingly took military planners by surprise: 
despite the  
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 previous experiences of the United States fighting a relatively high intensity 
conflict in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th Century,6 the United States 
seemed to come into the fighting in the Pacific as if it had never known combat in 
the region. The lessons that might have been learned during the Philippine-
American War seem to have been almost entirely discarded in favor of the more 
recent lessons learned from the First World War, despite the massive geographic 
dissimilarities between the Pacific and Europe. 
 However, it would be remiss to say that the United States made no 
conscious effort to prepare for such a war. The American military establishment 
had actually spend much of the previous two decades preparing for a war with 
Japan, centered around a series of war plans labeled War Plan Orange.7 While 
War Plan Orange proved to be instrumental in the actual strategic prosecution of 
the war, it was a document purely of strategy, and gave little thought to the 
geographic and environmental conditions that American forces would encounter 
in the Theater. 
 However, the importance of War Plan Orange should not be entirely 
discounted, as it was instrumental in preparing the armed forces of the United 
States for the war in the Pacific, regardless of its unanticipated shortcomings. 
War Plan Orange was a theoretical War Plan created in the interwar period to 
speculate as to what might happen in a war between the United States and 
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 Japan. As in all of the war plans of the period, the United States was the Blue 
country, and a country representing Japan was labeled as the Orange country, 
thus the designation War Plan Orange.8 While various iterations of the plan were 
considered by military staff for some time, the first formalized plan to be signed 
off on by the Secretaries of War and the Navy were drafted in 1924.9 The 
creation of War Plan Orange was motivated by two things: the ascension of 
Japan to relevance on the international stage,10 and the desire of the Marine 
Corps to continue their existence as an independent branch.11  
Following World War I, the Army claimed that the existence of the Marine 
Corps was redundant, citing the fact that the Marines had been used solely as 
land based infantry in France, and thus fulfilled a role no different than that of the 
Army.12 But a conflict in which the war would be decided solely based on the 
success or failure of amphibious assaults against fortified beaches would 
necessitate the existence of a branch of the American armed forces that would 
be capable of such tasks, and as such, this new doctrine would not only be 
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 central to War Plan Orange, but also to Marine Corps training. 
While many of the big picture questions regarding how a war would be 
fought in the Pacific between the United States and Japan were answered before 
the war ever broke out, thanks in large part to the foresight of the various 
strategic planners of the Marine Corps, the Army, and the Navy, many more 
questions would arise due to the peculiar geography of the Pacific after the task 
of fighting and winning such a war was actually at hand. These questions would 
form many of the critical stumbling blocks encountered by the American forces 
early in the war, and the answers to these questions would each provide their 
own incremental, but ultimately instrumental step towards the ultimate victory of 
the United States. 
While Jonathan M. House may have seen the innovations in army group 
level combined arms warfare as one of the most important concepts to be taken 
away from the fighting in World War II, the fighting in the Pacific yielded a great 
number of innovations, ranging from strategic and tactical doctrinal innovations, 
to technological and medical innovations. The one thing that ties these various 
innovations together is that they were born out of necessity, as the US military 
found itself fighting not only a hostile and incredibly determined enemy, but also 
against unforgiving geographic conditions. 
 
The Geography of the Theater, and the Question of Logistics 
In the beginning of his analysis of War Plan Orange, Edward S. Miller 
 observed that “geography is the bones of strategy.”13 This is true on both the 
strategic and tactical level, and has been true throughout history. From the 
tactical level, many of the most memorable battles throughout history are as 
memorable as they are because of the ability of one side to adapt to the 
geography. The battle of Thermopylae might have been lost to history had the 
Greek forces not made their stand at a narrow bottleneck, and in doing so 
negated much of the numerical advantage that the Persian army possessed. 
Waterloo may have proceeded very differently had the Duke of Wellington not 
deployed his forces on the reverse slope of the raised road that ran through the 
battlefield, effectively negating the terrifying effect of the massed barrage of 
Napoleon’s grande batterie. The effective use of terrain, and the consideration of 
geography has always been a critical factor in the success or failure of an army 
in the field. 
 On the strategic level, this concept was perhaps never more true than in 
the Pacific. In order to successfully fight and win a war in the Pacific, the primary 
consideration of the planners had to be the Pacific Ocean itself, as “the war 
theater would extend across five thousand miles of the north Pacific from Hawaii 
to the Asian coast, a region of much water and little land.”14 The war in the Pacific 
would not be one of grand land battles, battalion and brigade level maneuvers, 
and the highly advanced German style of combined arms warfare. Instead, it 
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 would primarily be a maritime war,15 punctuated by fierce battles over the tiny 
scraps of land dotting the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean. 
 To understand why the Pacific Ocean itself was such an important 
strategic consideration, one must first understand the immense size of it. The 
Pacific Ocean covers some seventy million square miles (approximately one third 
of the total surface area of the earth), and is up to fifteen thousand miles across 
at its widest point, approximately 8° North, from Panama to the Malay 
peninsula.16 In comparison, the entirety of Europe, from the Iberian peninsula to 
the Ural mountains, is only some four million square miles. The expanded 
European theater, including all of North Africa, would come in at just under twelve 
million square miles. 
 The immense scale of the Pacific caused logistical issues on a scale not 
before seen. The question of logistics, of how to supply a fighting army with all of 
the various forms of war materiel that it needs in order to fight, has long been one 
of the central concerns in warfare. From the baggage trains and camp followers 
of armies of antiquity, to the advances made in the Napoleonic wars, and 
subsequently studied by Carl von Clausewitz, the methods of supplying an army 
have always been important. Continental wars simplify the issue of logistics 
considerably: war materiel can be massed in the rear at supply depots, and 
distributed to the units on the front as needed. Just as the men on the front line 
are fed the supplies that they need by the supply depots in the rear, the supply 
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 depots are fed the supplies that they distribute from the industrial facilities of the 
country in question.  
Unfortunately, this logistical model had to be heavily modified in order to fit 
in the Pacific. In the early stages of the fighting in the Pacific, a supply depot 
could be thousands of miles from a battle field. In On War, Carl von Clausewitz 
posed a question regarding whether war would dictate the system of 
subsistence, or whether the system of subsistence would instead dictate the 
course of the war.17 Von Clausewitz determined that the system of subsistence 
would indeed dictate the course of the war, and perhaps never was this more true 
than in the Pacific. The Pacific was simply too vast for a traditional logistical 
model to work, and as such, the grand strategy of the war had to be molded 
around the logistical requirements of such a war. In the Pacific, it simply was not 
feasible to establish permanent and constant supply lines. Rather, as was the 
case on Guadalcanal,18 the soldiers on the ground had to rely on that with which 
they came ashore, and on intermittent seaborne resupply convoys, which could 
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 be intercepted and turned back or sunk. 
 Complicating matters was the fact that so little was known about the 
Pacific in comparison to Europe, which was thoroughly mapped, and had played 
host to n innumerable conflicts throughout human history. Rottman notes that 
what maps did exist often only detailed coastal terrain features, and had little to 
no information on the interiors of the islands.19 As such, the forces involved in 
amphibious assaults at times had very little information regarding the actual sort 
of combat environment that they would be operating in after they made landfall. 
Furthermore, many of the available maps were outdated and inaccurate. Some of 
the naval charts used by the United States at the outbreak of the war dated as far 
back as the eighteenth century.20 As such, American military forces would 
encounter situations such as a “ship, lying offshore of an island, reported she 
was one to one and one-half miles inland according to the chart,” and that “naval 
engagements were sometimes terminated for fear of running aground in 
uncharted waters.”21 
 What did this all mean? The war in the Pacific would have to proceed in a 
manner entirely unfamiliar to those planning the war. The grand battlefield that 
the Pacific ocean presented was as much of a mystery as the enemy. Unlike the 
familiar landscapes of Europe, the men fighting in the Pacific would be venturing 
into literally unknown territory. They would be relying on supply lines of 
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 unprecedented lengths, and would be fighting across incomparable distances. 
 
The Geography of the Islands, and the Implications on Combat 
 For as expansive as the Pacific Ocean is, the vast majority of the islands 
of the Pacific that would play host to the land battles of the war were on the 
opposite end of the spectrum. While the theater was massive in overall size, the 
total amount of land that would end up being fought over was tiny, in comparison 
to the European theater. When you exclude Japan, Australia, New Zealand, New 
Guinea, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, the total land area of the 
remainder of the islands in the Pacific Ocean is just some 42,000 square miles: 
only slightly bigger than the state of Ohio.22 23 
 The relatively tiny amount of land present in the Pacific Ocean had a 
number of peculiar effects on the fighting that took place there. As outlined 
earlier, much of the doctrine of modern combined arms warfare had to be 
discarded: there simply was not room on many of the islands of the Pacific for the 
highly mobile tanks and other forms of modern armor to be particularly effective 
instruments of war. Even if there was room, many other conditions made armor a 
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 very unattractive option. Ranging from swamps, to fine volcanic sand and ash,24 
as well as steep terrain, the geography of the islands in the Pacific was not 
conducive to tanks and many other modern weapons of war. In many senses, the 
war in the Pacific was a war that was fought and won by the infantryman and his 
rifle. Hanson W. Baldwin perhaps best characterized the nature of the fighting in 
the Pacific when he claimed that “It is the man on two feet with hand grenades, 
rifle and bayonet - backed by all that modern science can devise - the man with 
fear in his stomach but a fighting heart, who must secure beachheads. He it is 
who wins the glory and pays the price, who changes the course of history. Man is 
still supreme in mechanistic war.”25 
 The nature of the fighting once on land was not the only concern in the 
Pacific. While the confines of the islands that served as the battlefields of the 
Pacific had their own effect on the fighting, the most unique aspect of the fighting 
was in fact how the soldiers got to the fight. In the Pacific, armies did not 
maneuver, feint, flank, withdraw, and regroup. The battlefields were not simply 
where two armies happened to meet on campaign. The battlefields were the 
beachheads, and often every last inch of the island past the beach. American 
commanders did not have the luxury of fielding the entirety of their forces before 
battle was joined. Rather, the first waves of soldiers to hit the beach found 
themselves under heavy fire. They were outnumbered, outgunned and pinned 
down on the beach, and would often remain so until they could build up the 
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 critical mass of forces necessary to begin conducting effective offensive 
operations inland. While the defending force has always held an edge over the 
attacking force in warfare, this advantage was particularly pronounced in the 
Pacific, as the attacking forces were disadvantaged to a significant degree due to 
the constraints placed on the attack by the nature of amphibious landings. 
 However, the fact that the attacking American forces had to arrive 
piecemeal aboard waves of landing craft was not the only significant advantage 
afforded to the defenders in the Pacific. Due to geologic forces, the landing sites 
were incredibly predictable, and thus very easy to defend. Some islands would 
only have a few suitable beaches to put ashore landing craft, with the rest of the 
coast being dominated by rocky shores and cliffs.  
One of the bigger impediments to the amphibious assault forces provided 
by the islands of the Pacific would prove to be the coral reefs found around many 
of the islands. At the outbreak of the war, very little was known about coral, and 
of how it would impact the fighting in the Pacific.26 The coral reefs surrounding 
many of the islands in the Pacific proved to be extremely difficult obstacles when 
it came time to mount amphibious assaults upon them. On the windward side of 
islands, the coral reefs tended to be narrower, but were far less predictable, and 
tended to have a far greater density of potholes and coral heads. Additionally, 
there was significantly more wave action on the windward side of islands, which, 
when combined with the treacherous and unpredictable nature of the reefs, 
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 served to make amphibious landings difficult.27  
On the other hand, the leeward side of the islands was more sheltered 
and tended to have less wave action, but much wider coral reefs. Depending on 
tides, the reefs could be covered by as little as just a few inches of water at low 
tide, or by several feet of water at high tide.28 While the leeward side of the island 
was often preferred due to more predictable nature of the reef, landings on the 
leeward side could often be disastrous, such as at Tarawa, where unexpectedly 
low tides forced many members of the assault force to disembark from their 
landing craft hundreds of yards from shore after the boats became stuck on the 
reef.29 
Once ashore, further difficulties were encountered. The defenders could 
already prepare their defenses with a great bias towards the likely landing sites, 
and had ample time to prepare the rest of their defenses throughout the island. 
On Peleliu, the Japanese garrison had prepared a frightening series of defenses. 
To the left (north) of the landing beaches was a heavily fortified point that 
provided the defenders a well protected position from which to pour enfilade fire 
onto the landing beach. So impressive were the Japanese fortifications on the 
Point that the Marine Corps would go on to build a full scale mock up of it at 
Quantico as an example for officers in training of “how to assault a ‘doomsday’ 
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 defense.”30  
Once the beaches had been secured and the Point neutralized, the 
assault force came across the Umurbrogol: a series of coral31 and stone ridges 
that housed an impressive set of fortifications. These defenses featured “Well 
dug in pillboxes and fortified cave positions [that] were developed in depth with 
interlocking fields of fire providing mutual support. The natural defenses were 
reinforced by elaborate tunnel systems...”32 which were further augmented by 
defenses including armored steel doors which “covered the entrances to caves 
with the biggest guns... The largest of them held a thousand men and a number 
of the caves were five and six stories deep. The caves were ideally located for 
defense, in a 300-foot-high mountain of jagged coral, with sheer cliffs.”33  
Peleliu was just one example of impressive defensive value afforded by 
the terrain of many of the islands in the Pacific. On Iwo Jima, Mount Suribachi 
was turned into a honeycomb of tunnels, pill boxes and fortified bunkers.34 On 
Okinawa, General Mitsuru Ushijima concentrated almost the entirety of his forces 
in and around the cliffs and ridges around Shuri castle, on the south end of the 
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 island. Ushijima supervised the construction of an array of fortifications based 
around these natural defenses, in addition to converting the traditional Okinawan 
underground tombs into bomb shelters and fortified command posts.35 
 Finally, the small size of the islands, along with the relatively large 
garrisons of defenders and assault forces, led to some of the most cramped 
conditions in modern warfare. On Iwo Jima, the Japanese Garrison numbered 
some 21,000 defenders, and the American invasion force numbered some 
70,000 men. Over 90,000 men would be fighting over an island that measured 
approximately eight square miles36--a human density that would put Iwo Jima on 
par with some of the more densely populated urban centers in 2013. With the 
sheer number of soldiers on both sides, and the limited land, the battles often 
devolved into something reminiscent of a scrum in rugby: two opposing forces 
grinding one another down at close range until one side is forced to cede. A 
Marine major observed that the fighting on Iwo Jima was similar to a football 
game, with one major caveat: you could not “run the ends up there... Every play 
is between the tackles.”37 The density of soldiers of Iwo Jima had another tragic 
effect: the effect of artillery was magnified to a frightening extent. With so many 
soldiers packed into such a small area, not only was artillery more likely to hit the 
men, but it often hit a far greater number of men than in other areas. This was 
part of the reason why 8% of American servicemen wounded on Iwo Jima would 
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 die of their wounds, almost triple the fatality rate for wounded American soldiers 
for the rest of World War II (3%).38 
Near the end of the campaign on Okinawa in 1945, as American forces 
began to assault the Japanese fortifications on the Shuri Line, centered on Shuri 
Castle on the southern end of Okinawa, the density of combatants reached levels 
unseen at any other point in modern warfare. William Manchester described the 
scene along the Shuri line in a manner which cannot be equaled: 
Counting both sides, the [Shuri Line] represented an extraordinary 
concentration of 300,000 fighting men and countless terrified civilians, on 
a battleground that was about as wide as the distance between Capitol Hill 
in Washington and Arlington National Cemetery. In the densest combat of 
World War I, battalion frontage39 had been approximately eight hundred 
yards. Here it was less than six hundred yards. ...there was nothing green 
left; artillery had denuded and scarred every inch of ground.”40 
 
It is difficult to put into words what this meant. The trench warfare that 
characterized World War I is often remembered as some of the most densely 
packed, hellish fighting in modern times, and not unrightfully so. Yet, on Okinawa, 
the soldiers were packed in 25% more densely. Along the front line, on average, 
there was a man less than every two feet. These were the sort of combat 
conditions that the islands of the Pacific engendered. 
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 Environmental Factors, Tropical Disease, and Medical Factors 
  The islands of the south and central Pacific regions were all tropical or 
sub-tropical; they tended to have high temperatures and high humidity--
conditions which are noted to produce enervating effects on individuals not 
accustomed to them.41 These islands often played host to a great number of 
tropical diseases. While malaria was the most prevalent of the tropical diseases, 
and tends to get the most attention, the men fighting in the Pacific were exposed 
to a wide range of other diseases such as dysentery, beriberi, dengue fever, 
leprosy, and hookworm.42 Gordon Rottman notes that “the horrid living conditions 
imposed by combat in such an environment only inflicted more suffering on 
combatants.”43 The environmental conditions in the Pacific were extremely 
challenging: the issues of temperature and humidity contributed to exhaustion, 
fatigue, and sleep deprivation; the near constant rains and presence of swamps 
contributed to trench foot; the logistical challenges led to increased rates of 
dehydration44 and malnutrition (which contributed to the contraction of beriberi); 
the constant mental stress of operating in such an environment led to a higher 
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 incidence of the psychological illness combat fatigue, as well as an increase in 
non-combat accidents and self-inflicted wounds.45 These factors, combined with 
the ferocity of the combat experienced in the Pacific, resulted in a massive 
disparity in casualty rates in the Pacific and in the European theater: 2.16 
casualties per 1000 soldiers per day in Europe, compared to a staggering 7.45 
casualties per 1000 soldiers per day in the Pacific.46 
One of the defining aspects of the war in the Pacific was the oppressive 
presence of the myriad of tropical diseases in the region. Early in the war, before 
effective prevention and treatment plans were in place, the rate of disease and 
illness related casualties far outstripped the rate of casualties caused directly by 
combat.  This was perhaps most pronounced during the New Guinea campaign, 
where malaria was the worst offender: “Malaria struck down half a million 
American servicemen in the Pacific War. At the start of the New Guinea 
campaign [January 1942], malaria produced four times as many allied casualties 
as did Japanese weapons.”47 Robert Leckie vividly describes the ravages that 
malaria visited upon so many American soldiers, recalling that he could neither 
eat nor drink, and had to be fed intravenously for approximately two weeks. 
Leckie described his fevers as leaving him to feel “baking... feeling the will to live 
shriveling within me, yearning only for a tiny trickle of sweat to burst from my 
                                            
45
  Rottman, Pacific Island Guide, 10. 
46
  Rottman, Pacific Island Guide, 10. 
47
  Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, “Malaria in the Southwest Pacific in World War II 1940-1944,” 
in Science and the Pacific War, ed. Roy M. MacLeod (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000), 51. 
 desiccated flesh.”48 
In addition to near catastrophic malaria rates early on in the Pacific, 
American forces also encountered another epidemic: psychiatric disability. As 
noted earlier, the conditions in the Pacific were sufficient to considerably 
exacerbate the ever present threat of psychiatric casualties presented by war, 
commonly lumped together into catch all terms such as “shell shock” (prevalent 
during World War I) and “combat fatigue,” or “Guadalcanal Neurosis.” Combat 
fatigue became the new catch-all term in World War II after it was discovered that 
the psychiatric issues encountered were not a direct result of the concussive 
effects of high explosive shelling. “Guadalcanal Neurosis” was an early diagnosis 
for combat fatigue after it reached near epidemic rates on Guadalcanal.49 
Josephine Bresnehan notes that within six months of the outbreak of the fighting, 
“the difference between soldiers expectations and their experiences had 
generated more physical and psychological distress than their training taught 
them to handle and thus began to precipitate a morale meltdown in the Pacific 
theater.”50 The psychiatric crisis in the Pacific only got worse: by October of 1943, 
more than 10,000 men were being discharged per month due to what was being 
labeled as psychiatric disabilities.51 In some areas, these psychiatric casualties 
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 made up more than half of all casualties,52 with the balance of the casualties 
being made up of men stricken by disease, and those wounded by enemy fire. 
 
Science in the Pacific: Overcoming the Geography, Overcoming the 
Environment 
 It should be clear at this point that the military forces of the United States 
were effectively fighting two enemies in the Pacific theater: the military forces of 
Japan, and the Pacific region itself. In order to conquer both of these enemies, 
the Pacific became the grounds for the deployment of an unprecedented number 
of new technological and and medical advances: 
“The list of new science-based innovations far outshone the list imagined 
by H.G. Wells on the eve of the Great War, or available to Field Marshal 
Douglas Haig at its end. Radar, rockets, improved systems of fire control; 
explosives, propellants, flame-throwers and napalm; advanced chemical 
weapons; and the applications of operational research emerged alongside 
penicillin and anti-malarial drugs, improved means of storing and shipping 
blood, and new and powerful insecticides.”53 
 
By war’s end, the American military would find itself relying heavily on the 
achievements of scientists back home, and on new technology that had not 
existed at the beginning of the war. 
At first, the high command in the American military attempted to simply 
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 push through the fighting conditions in the Pacific. At the outbreak of the war, the 
attitude of American officers towards the environmental factors in the Pacific was 
best summed up in this quote attributed to an anonymous high ranking officer: 
“We are here to kill Japs and to hell with mosquitoes.”54 There was effectively no 
effort by the officer corps to attempt to control malaria, and its prevention was 
seemingly the last thing on the minds of those in command. 
 However, as malaria and other tropical disease related casualty rates 
continued to spiral out of control, and reached the point that they were seriously 
compromising the American war effort,55 the American high command began to 
take action. For the rest of the war, the military community would work hand in 
hand with the scientific community at an unprecedented level. It was because of 
the geographic and environmental factors present in the Pacific that the military 
was forced to “[mobilize] scientific knowledge on behalf of the fighting soldier.”56 
World War II, and especially the campaign in the Pacific, represented the first 
time in history that a major war would be “affected decisively by weapons 
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 unknown at the outbreak of the war.”57 It was not just newly developed weapons 
that would help win the war: it was also the technological and medical efforts of 
the scientists and doctors. 
 In November of 1942, just as the malaria epidemic on Guadalcanal was 
reaching its height, Admiral William “Bull” F. Halsey, Jr., the newly promoted 
commander of the South Pacific (SOPAC) region, authorized the creation of 
malaria control units, and ordered all officers in theater to comply with the control 
units. Officers were instructed to consult malaria control units before the 
establishment of any camps or airfields, so as to avoid placing areas of 
permanent or long term habitation near local hyper-endemic malaria zones.58 
Additionally, soldiers began to be issued quinine and mosquito nets as 
preventative measures.59 Clothing began to be regulated after General George 
C. Kenney ran an experiment at the behest of medical officers. He had one group 
of men wear long sleeves and pants while on duty, and the other group wear 
short sleeves and pants. At the end of the month, there were a total of two cases 
of malaria in the former group, compared to a staggering 62 in the latter.60  
 While preventative measures were being instituted in theater, the 
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 American medical and scientific community rallied around the threat posed by 
tropical illnesses. During the war, DEET, DDT, and insecticidal fumigation 
bombs61 would be researched, developed, and deployed in the combat theater. 
In addition to the insecticides used to attack the source of malaria, new anti-
malarial drugs would be synthesized and deployed during the war. Atabrine, 
which had been synthesized by German scientists in the early 1930s, entered 
trials in the US, and began to be mass produced during the war.62 The 
effectiveness of atabrine, along with other preventative measures was 
demonstrated quickly after its initial deployment among Australian soldiers in 
New Guinea. The Australian soldiers, who were known to exhibit poor mosquito 
net discipline, suffered a peak of 4840 malaria related casualties per 100063 
soldiers per year. After mosquito net discipline was enforced, and atabrine doses 
were doubled from .6 to 1.2 grams per week, the rate of malaria related 
casualties fell to 740 per 1000 soldiers per year in a period of just two months 
(between November 1942 and January 1943).64 
 Elsewhere in the Pacific, allied forces saw similar reductions. In the hyper-
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 endemic malarial conditions in Milne Bay, New Guinea, allied forces suffered 
3300 malaria related casualties per 1000 soldiers per year in January 1943. One 
year later, in January of 1944, the malaria casualty rate had fallen to 
31/1000/year.65 Across the Southwest Pacific Area of command, the malaria rate 
averaged 794/1000/year in February of 1943, and was reduced to 179/1000/year 
by February of 1944.66 Eugene Sledge notes in his memoirs that by the time he 
first saw combat, during the campaign on Peleliu (September-November 1944), 
all soldiers began their Atabrine treatments during transit to the islands, before 
even being exposed to malaria.67 
 Psychiatric casualties saw similar reductions as new treatment techniques 
emerged. Prior to World War II, psychiatrists had thought that they had solved the 
mystery of shell shock: it was not, in fact, the result of the repeated concussive 
forces of artillery bombardments, but was rather childhood trauma being 
manifested as a psychiatric illness when the affected soldier was exposed to 
traumatic battlefield conditions.68 As a result, soldiers were subjected to induction 
psychiatric screenings, as it would be impossible to “set off this disorder in 
anyone who was not already psychologically predisposed.”69 However, as rates 
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 of “war neurosis” and “combat fatigue” spiralled out of control in the early stages 
of the war in the Pacific, doctors began taking a very different approach. Morale 
programs were enacted to attempt to keep the spirits of the soldiers up, and 
troops were rotated off the front line with greater frequency. If soldiers showed 
signs of being on the verge of breaking down, rather than keeping them in the 
fight until a breakdown actually occurred, they would be pulled off the line for a 
minimum of 48 hours of “rapid return” therapy to determine if they were fit to 
return to duty after a small break from the horrors of combat, or if they needed a 
longer recuperation period.70 
 But what of the various other challenges that American forces 
encountered? Many of those would be solved as well. The question of logistics 
was solved, in part, through the strategy of island hopping. American 
commanders recognized that it would be far too costly to assault and seize every 
Japanese held island across the Pacific. Instead, they picked and chose which 
islands to take. In doing so, they not only avoided a great number of costly 
battles, but they were able to let the islands that were passed over “die on the 
vine” so to speak. By only taking strategically important islands, American forces 
were essentially able to build a bridge across the Pacific closer and closer to the 
home islands of Japan. There was still a great deal of distance between the 
origin of the war materiel required, and the men in combat who required the 
materiel, but as the bridge across the Pacific was slowly built on the back of the 
amphibious assaults, American forces gained valuable real estate upon which to 
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 establish supply depots. While the distances between soldier and supply in the 
Pacific was never cut down to the level of the European theater, the distance was 
cut down significantly as more and more of the Pacific fell under Allied control. 
 In regards to the difficulties encountered in the battles themselves, those 
too were the subject of rapid scientific research and application. Many of the 
hardened Japanese bunkers that presented such difficult targets at the beginning 
of the war were soon rendered obsolete with the development of napalm at 
Harvard University.71 In addition to general anti-personnel uses, napalm was 
used to great effect against these Japanese fortifications by simply burning the 
oxygen out of the air inside, asphyxiating those taking shelter within.72 
 At the outbreak of the war, the Marines and Army forces that would be 
tasked with the amphibious assaults were extremely fortunate in one regard: they 
already had shallow drafted landing craft in the form of the Higgins boat, which 
was developed from earlier shallow draft vessels designed by Andrew Jackson 
Higgins in the late 1930’s through a series of military trials.73 74 However, the 
Higgins boat (or the LCVP: Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel) wasn’t always able 
to clear the reefs surrounding some of the islands. The shortcomings of the 
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 Higgins boats were supplemented by the LVT (Landing Vehicle, Tracked) and the 
DUKW75.  Both of these were amphibious vehicles that could go from ship to 
shore, but also possessed tank tracks. Originally designed to be able to crawl up 
past the beach, deliver supplies to troops on the island, and then swim back out 
to supply ships, it was quickly discovered that they were invaluable for climbing 




 Perhaps more so than any other theater of operations in modern warfare, 
the Pacific theater forced those fighting in it to adapt to its peculiarities. It was not 
a force that could be conquered and bent to the will of man. Rather, man had to 
submit to it, and rethink the conventions of warfare in order to fight, and win in 
the Pacific. 
 The war in the Pacific represented an amazing fusion of military ingenuity 
and scientific expertise. Without the innumerable contributions of scientists and 
doctors, the Allied victory in the Pacific simply would not have been possible. 
While the most obvious legacy of science in the Pacific theater is that of the 
atomic bomb, and the contributions of the physicists involved in the Manhattan 
Project, the United States may have never gotten within range of Japan to deliver 
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 the bombs that would end the war, and begin the Atomic Age, without the myriad 
of other inventions and innovations that were developed and implemented in the 
Pacific. 
 The war in the Pacific may have been a war that was unwinnable with the 
technology possessed at the outbreak of the war. The Japanese strategy at the 
beginning of the war actually seems realistic in hindsight: after the surprise attack 
at Pearl Harbor, it would rapidly expand and fortify the islands of the Pacific. 
Japan hoped that the United States would not be prepared for, or have the 
stomach for, a brutal war of attrition in the Pacific, and hoped to force the United 
States to negotiate a peace in the Pacific, leaving Japan atop a new Eastern 
Pacific empire.77 The Japanese were correct on one account: the United States 
was woefully unprepared for the war in the Pacific at the outbreak of the war. If 
not for the scientific innovations made during the war, and the willingness of the 
commanders to abandon traditional strategic and tactical doctrine in favor of new 
techniques that were more suited for the geography of the Pacific, the United 
States and its allies truly may not have been able to win the war, and may have 
been forced to sue for peace. 
 However, the military of the United States did adapt, and the technological 
and scientific advances necessary to win a total war in the Pacific were made. 
The unique character of the Pacific Ocean region necessitated an unprecedented 
level of adaptation and flexibility, and one of the key legacies of the Pacific was 
the ability of the American military to make the necessary changes to fight and 
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 win in one of the most varied and unforgiving environments touched by modern 
warfare. From the jungles and swamps of Guadalcanal, to the atolls of the central 
Pacific, and from the coral hell that was the Umurbrogol on Peleliu, to the shell 
scarred moonscapes of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the American military not only 
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